デレクパーフィットサマリー

今週末はデレクパーフィットの理由と人格の中の第3章、Personal Identity についてのペーパーを書いていました。文章や内容がすさまじく難しいってわけでは無いはずなんだけど、考えれば考えるほどわけわからなくなってしまった。自分の頭の悪さが悲しくなります。パーフィットってパンクな人！？かなり悟り開いてるって感じ！自身からの解放、とか言っちゃって。このあいだ読んだネーゲルと正反対で、自分の考えに確固とした自信を持ってますね。下は、私が取ったノートです。

<<パーフィットの意見>>
Reductionist View 還元主義 = a person’s existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events.
Identity is not always determinate, not a further fact. A person is a distinct entity from brain and body, and such series of events, YET it is not a separately existing entity (explained by the example of Venus and Evening Star). Identity doesn’t matter; reality can be described in an impersonal way

<<パーフィットはSFチックな想像上のケースが好き>>
1. Simple teletransportation - Me on Mars = Me who was on earth (according to psychological criterion) no physical continuity, but psychological continuity exists (in the wide sense ... narrow = normal cause. wide = reliable cause. widest = any cause )
2. Branch line case - Mars replica = Me on earth (according to Relation R)?
Qualitatively identical, but numerically different.

<<３つのスぺクトラム>>
P. 236. The three choices (a) indeterminate = no true answer whether it is me or someone else = reductionist (b) not me = sharp borderline = identity is determinate (c) still me

1. Psychological spectrum - (c) the person in result is still me (because there is still physical continuity)
2. Physical spectrum - (c) same as above (because there is still psychological continuity assuming physical change does not cause psychological change) << 2 provides the proof that psychological criteria is necessary for personal identity in some cases disproving Williams’ opinion that physical criterion is sufficient in all the cases. >>
？？パーフィットは、上記の2つの場合はIdentityはdeterminateだ、と認めているのかな？後のほうではやっぱりIndeterminateだ、ってimplyしてるような気もするけど・・。Psychological と Physical Criterionを認めていれば、このふたつのスぺクトラムの中ではIdentityはdeterminateでしか有り得ない気がする・・・どうなの？？

3. Combined spectrum - (b) the person in result is not me? (Because of no connection of either psychological or physical states; assuming brain states = mental states)
... If the person in result is not me, there must be a sharp line where “I” cease to exist in the spectrum. ... but it is (1) extremely small difference. one cell can determine identity the resulting person is neither straightforwardly me nor someone else; (2) hard to believe there is a sharp borderline without any evidence. ( we could decide where the borderline is, but the decision will be arbitrary. ) ... therefore, the answer is (a) reductionist.
パーフィットは、このCombined Spectrumが自分の意見である還元主義をサポートしている、と思っている。

小さな違いが深い違いにつながってもいいじゃないか、とか、証拠が無くたって信じてもいいじゃないか、とか、反論がでてきそう。どっちにしろ論理では無くて直観に基づいている意見のような気がする・・・でも直観も立派な理由なのかしら。

“Is this me or someone else?” “Am I going to die?” = empty questions (w/o right or wrong answer)